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Abstract: Scholars have long debated the significance of race in shaping the sociopolitical 
attitudes of White-Americans in the arena of race-based polices. But few studies have 
addressed this debate in the context of contemporary black political action. Using 
nationally representative data from the 2016 American National Election Studies Survey, 
I investigate the association between racial attitudes and White orientation towards Black 
Lives Matter, while controlling for prominent race-neutral explanations. Contrary to 
claims that modern opposition is fueled by ostensibly race-neutral factors such as general 
orientation towards protest and police, conservative ideology, or a moral equalitarian 
concern for all lives, I find that racial attitudes are the dominant predictors of 
contemporary White opposition to the movement. Furthermore, though scholars have 
argued that colorblind racism is the dominant racial schema of the 21st century, my results 
indicate that overt racism and nationalism are also highly significant schemas driving 
White opposition towards Black Lives Matter. Together these insights bring White 
opposition towards Black Lives Matter into sharper focus and serves as a window into 
race relations in the contemporary context. 
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White-Americans report strong support for the principles of racial equality and 
integration, but are far less likely to support policies designed to ameliorate existing 
racial disparities (Schuman et. al 1998; Krysan 2000; Tuch and Hughes 2011). This has 
generated substantial debate over whether and to what extent racial attitude1 shape White 
sociopolitical orientations in the contemporary United States. Much of this debate has 
occurred in the arena of race-based policies, where it remains unresolved whether 
opposition is fundamentally a matter of political ideology or racial animus. I argue that an 
even clearer approach to this debate is through examining White attitudes towards direct 
Black political claims expressed through collective action. However, there is limited 
systemic evidence on White orientations towards Black political action in the 
contemporary context.  
Since 2013, the Black Lives Matter movement is arguably the most significant 
and sustained wave of Black political action since the Civil Rights movement. 
Descriptive analyses of public opinion towards the movement show divisions along racial 
and political lines (Pew Research Center 2016). Thus, though we know who is 
demographically more or less likely to support the movement, there is limited evidence 
on the factors that are shaping these divisions. This study has two objectives. The first 
objective is to examine the role of racial attitudes in shaping orientation towards Black 
Lives Matter while accounting for prominent race-neutral alternative explanations. 
Second, to better understand the within-group variation, the next objective is to examine 
the predictive power of key sociodemographic characteristics on the four racial schemas 
tested in this study specifically colorblind racism, overt racism, perceived group threat, 
and nationalism.    
                                                
1 I define racial attitudes as “favorable or unfavorable evaluation of racial and ethnic groups” (Schumann 
1998). I use racial attitudes to refer to the general racial attitudes under investigation. I use racial schemas 
to refer to the four race-related “attitudinal frameworks,” which are groups of racial attitudes that hang 
together under a common theme.  
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In racialized social systems where power and resource are systematically 
distributed along racial lines, ethnoracial movements are crucial sites for contestation 
over racial politics (Bonilla-Silva 2015). Furthermore, detecting the factors that shape 
public opinion is critical to understanding interactions between dominant publics and 
ethnoracial movements, which can ultimately affect the political outcomes of the 
movement (Thomas and Louis 2014). Therefore, the objective of this article is to bring 
contemporary White opposition towards Black political action into sharper focus.  
 It offers the following insights. (1) Racial attitudes are the dominant predictors of 
opposition towards the Black Lives Matter movement net of major ostensibly race-
neutral explanations  (2) Contrary to a prevalent truism in the race literature that 
colorblind racism has largely replaced overt racism in the contemporary era, my results 
show that overt racism is a highly significant and independent predictor of opposition 
towards the movement.  (3) Additionally, income, education, and political party are 
highly consistent predictors of all four racial schemas tested namely overt racism, 
colorblind racism, perceived group threat, and nationalism. However, White men are 
more likely to report overt racism whereas White women are more likely to report 
perceived group threat and nationalism. Together these insights engage the broader 
theoretical debate over what factors shape White opposition towards government as well 






Scholars have advanced a number of explanations for why White-Americans are 
supportive of racial equality in principle and significantly less supportive of government 
interventions intended to improve racial disparities. The theories can be divided into two 
key theoretical camps: theories that deemphasize the role of race and theories that 
centralize the significance of race in shaping the sociopolitical views and behaviors of 
White-Americans. Although most of these theoretical frameworks have been employed to 
understand attitudes towards race-based policies, they are also useful in motivating 
potential explanations for opposition towards Black political action. In this section, I 
review the major theoretical arguments concerning this debate. I refer to the theoretical 
camps as “race-neutral” and “race-centric.” Even proponents that deemphasize the 
significance of race rarely negate its influence completely. But the distinction is valuable 
because a central line of division between the camps is whether racial attitudes exert a 
dominant effect over sociopolitical views and behaviors of White-Americans in the 
contemporary United States.  
RACE-NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS  
There are four prominent “race-neutral” explanations that have been advanced to 
explain white opposition to government interventions designed to address racial 
disparities. In this study, I examine the explanatory power of these explanations in white 
opposition towards a popular intervention challenging racial disparities through 
collective action. Arguably the most prominent explanation is the principled conservative 
perspective. According to principled conservatism, while racial animus drove White 
sociopolitical attitudes in the past, contemporary opposition towards Black political 
action is likely based in race-neutral conservative ideologies (Sniderman, Crosby, & 
Howell, 2000; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986a). This 
perspective claims that people oppose race-based policies because American values of 
equity and individualism are at odds with policies that allocate opportunity on the basis of 
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race irrelevant to personal merit (Kuklinski et al., 1997). Therefore, policies that include 
ethnoracial recognition and redistribution are considered problematic. Principled 
conservatism theorists claim that these political ideologies are distinct from racial animus 
through evidence that once conservatism and individualistic values are controlled, 
measures of racial attitudes only weakly predict opposition to race-based policies 
(Sniderman, Brody, & Kuklinski, 1984).   
Within the race-neutral camp, it has also been argued that general orientation 
towards protest as a political strategy may shape opposition towards Black political 
action, but that this disapproval extends to all forms of disruptive collective action. For 
example, social movement scholars find evidence for a general public sensitivity to 
protest characteristics such as size of protest and level of civil disobedience particularly 
disruptive and violent tactics (Fair and Shepherd 2006; Zaal, Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, and 
Derks 2011). In a similar vein,  research also suggests that a general orientation towards 
law enforcement may also shape attitudes towards movements. Protests must indirectly or 
directly in contact with law enforcement whose institutional role is to maintain public 
order (Della Porta and Fillieule 2007). Therefore, those that are more supportive of police 
and their institutional role in maintaining public order against public disruptions may also 
be less likely to support protests.   
But there are further reasons why a positive orientation towards the police may be 
particularly associated with negative attitudes towards the Black Lives Matter movement. 
Black Lives Matter protests has been largely centered around the issue of police brutality 
(Camp and Heatherton 2016). For example, the counter-mobilization Blue Lives Matter 
discursively organizes their opposition to Black Lives Matter around a concern for law 
enforcement. Furthermore, scholars of legal cynicism have shown that White-Americans 
generally have higher levels of trust in institutions such as law enforcement (Kirk and 
Papacristos 2011). Therefore, although these orientations are not explicitly based in race, 
the aforementioned reasons lead me to expect that these orientations are at least partially 
correlated with racial attitudes (Bobo 1988). 
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Another argument is the moral equalitarianism perspective. This perspective is that 
an equalitarian belief in all lives fuels opposition towards a movement that centralizes the 
lives of one racial group. The claim is that an ethnoracial movement privileging the lives 
of one racial group over the lives of other Americans is at odds with beliefs about 
equality among citizens. According to this perspective, we should then expect that 
individuals who hold stronger beliefs in equality to oppose the Black Lives Matter 
movement.  
RACE CENTRIC EXPLANATIONS  
On the other side of this debate are theorists that emphasize the persisting 
relevance of racism in shaping White sociopolitical views and actions (Bobo, Kluegel, & 
Smith, 1997; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Federico & Sidanius, 2002). There are four 
prevalent race-centric explanations that I review in this section. Within the race literature, 
there is prevalent truism that the overt racism that pervaded the pre-Civil Rights context 
has declined and been largely replaced by colorblind racism (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 
1997; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2004). Colorblind racism is anchored in the 
belief that race no longer “matters” in the United States. Under this logic, racial 
disparities are justified by ideologies about the “cultural deficiencies” of racial minorities, 
the “naturalness of racial phenomena,” the “minimized or obsolete” significance of racial 
discrimination, and abstract liberal ideas of individualism, equal opportunity, and 
personal choice (Bonilla-Silva 1997; Hughey, Embrick, and Doane 2015; Omi and 
Winant 2015). Therefore, according to this perspective, opposition towards Black 
political action in the contemporary era is predominantly related to subscription to 
varying colorblind racial ideologies.  
In contrast to colorblind racism, overt racism make up what scholars theorize as 
“traditional racism.” This expression of racism are based in overtly racist beliefs in the 
biological inferiority of Black, anti-Black affect and negative stereotypes (Brown et. al 
2009). Though scholars have documented a decline in overt racism in national survey 
data (Schuman et. al 1998), there has also been evidence that overt racism is still 
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pervasive (Picca and Feagin 2007; Knuckley and Kim 2015). Still different scholars 
claim that while expressions of overt racism may have declined since the pre-Civil Rights 
era, but we are now seeing “a return to old-fashioned racism” evidenced by the overtly 
racist beliefs predicting partisan attitudes during Obama’s presidency (Tesler 2016).  
Beyond colorblind and overt racism, Blumer advanced a theoretical perspective 
that claims racial animus stems from perceived collective threat (Blumer 1958).  
According to this theory, group are hierarchally ordered in relation to one another and 
thus perceived threats to “a sense of group position,” is the root of racial prejudice 
(Blumer 1958). Group threat theorists propose that perceived threat can be both realistic 
threats to material resources and symbolic threats to status and group position (Bobo et al 
1997; Stephen et. al 2002). For example, Quillian found that the average degree of 
reported prejudice in 12 European countries is strongly related to the threat perceived by 
the dominant group residents there (Quillian 1995). Furthermore, studies show that many 
White-Americans consider anti-White discrimination to be a bigger societal problem than 
anti-Black discrimination (Norton and Sommers 2011). Thus, perceived discrimination is 
likely an increasingly important form of perceived threat among White-Americans. 
According to this perspective, respondents that report higher levels of perceived group 
threat are less likely to support the Black Lives Matter movement.  
Finally, mationalism and racism are particularly difficult concepts to disentangle. 
However, as nations are socially constructed “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983), 
nationalism depends on individuals conceptualizing who is part of their imagined 
community and who is not (Theiss-Morse 2009). That is why nationalism and racism 
have been historically intertwined throughout history (Balibar and Wallerstein 2011). In 
the contemporary United States context, a study two classes of American popular 
nationalism were significantly associated with negative attitudes towards racial minorities 
and immigrants (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). This research suggests that nation-
based racial logics may also play a role in White attitudes towards Black political action 
in the United States.  
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In this section, I’ve reviewed the dominant theoretical perspective in the race-
neutral camp and race-centric camp that have been advanced to explain White 
sociopolitical attitudes towards racial issues.  This study tests these competing theories in 
the context of orientation towards contemporary black political action. If theories of 
principled conservatism, general orientation towards protest and police,  or moral 
equalitarianism are dominant predictors of attitudes towards the Black Lives Matter 
movement, then this suggests that contemporary opposition is largely related to 
ideological clashes over appropriate politics. In contrast, if race-centric theories are the 
strongest predictors of orientation towards the movement, then this implies that White 
sociopolitical views are still significantly shaped by their racial attitudes.  
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIATION  
In this study, I test four racial schemas: colorblind racism, overt racism, perceived 
group threat, and nationalism. Existing research suggests that there is sociodemographic 
variation in reported subscription to the various racial schemas. Scholars have found that 
colorblind racism is adopted broadly across the White population as well as across 
minority populations (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Carr 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2001; 
Dovidio and Gaertner 2004). However, studies indicate that there is more 
sociodemographic variation in individuals that report overt racial attitudes and perceived 
group threat. Scholars have found that conservativism and residence in the Southern 
region of the United States are significant predictors of more overt racial beliefs and 
perceptions of threat (Krysan 2000). Furthermore, a recent study found that Southern 
Whites particularly evangelical Protestants and Republicans were over-represented 
among Whites who report racial discrimination (Maryl and Saperstein 2013). They also 
found that lower education levels, recent unemployment, and younger ages were also 
associated with elevated rates of reported racial discrimination among Whites. 
Additionally, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) found that White-Americans categorized 
as ardent nationalists and restrictive nationalists had particularly unfavorable attitudes 
towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Republican, older, and less well-educated 
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were overrepresented in the ardent nationalist category. In contrast, restrictive nationalists 
were more likely to be individuals without a college degree, lower-income, evangelical 
Protestants, and women. According to this research, we can expect political party, 
religion, education, income, age, and gender to co-vary with subscription to the different 
racial schemas within the race-centric theoretical camp. 
BLACK LIVES MATTER MOVEMENT  
Catalyzed by the murder of Trayvon Martin and subsequent acquittal of George 
Zimmerman, the Black Lives Matter began in 2013 as a tweet by co-founder, Alicia 
Garza that affirmed Black lives. This was later transformed into the hashtag 
#Blacklivesmatter by co-founder Patrisse Cullors. Garza and Cullors along with third co-
founder Opal Tometi went on to build a movement around this mantra. The movement 
expanded to be a member-led global network of more than 40 chapters and is now part of 
an umbrella movement consisting of more than 50 organizations, the Movement for 
Black Lives. The movement is defined as an “ideological and political intervention in a 
world where Black Lives are systematically and intentionally targeted for demise. ….and  
an affirmation of Black folks’ humanity, our contributions to this society, and our 
resilience in the face of deadly oppression.” (Black Lives Matter).  
It is a legitimate case study of Black political action because of its visibility and 
significance, which Gamson (1976) argues are fundamental measures of movement 
success. In a 2016 article, media scholars found evidence that Black Lives Matter twitter 
activity actually predicts mainstream news coverage of police brutality, which in turn is 
the strongest driver of attention to the issue from political elites (Freelon et. al 2016). 
Furthermore, since Twitter’s inception in 2006, #BlackLivesMatter has been among the 
most used hashtags referring to a social cause (Lowery 2017). Additionally, Black Lives 
Matter movement leaders held meetings with both democratic presidential nominees in 
2015; a significant achievement by social movement standards (Freelon et. al 2016). The 
burgeoning evidence suggests that the Black Lives Matter movement is the most 
consequential wave of Black political action since the Civil Rights era (Leach and Allen 
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2017). Its significance makes examining attitudes towards the movement comparable to 
taking America’s racial pulse in the contemporary context, and yet few studies have taken 





My goal is to assess the degree to which theories of the race-centric camp and race-
neutral camp explain attitudes towards the Black Lives Matter movement. To do so, I 
operationalize the core concepts of each theory from each camp. I individually test the 
explanatory power of the race-centric model and race-neutral model while controlling for 
sociodemographic factors.  I then test the models together to examine the degree to which 
racial attitudes shape feelings towards the Black Lives Matter movement. Additionally, to 
better understand the within-group heterogeneity, I explore the association between key 
sociodemographic characteristics and the four racial schemas tested in this study 
specifically colorblind racism, overt racism, perceived group threat, and nationalism. 
DATA 
Data is drawn from the 2016 American National Elections Studies (ANES) Times Series 
Study. ANES is a rich, nationally representative dataset that provides high-quality data on 
public opinion and political behavior. It is also one of the first large datasets that contain 
a variable on feelings towards the Black Lives Matter movement. Data was collected in 
the beginning of early September 2016 and continued into January 2017. Pre-election 
interviews were conducted with study respondents during the two months prior to the 
2016 elections and were followed by post-election re-interviewing beginning November 
9, 2016.  The study is a complex sample design and consists of two independently drawn 
probability samples, an internet mode sample and a face-to-face mode sample. They both 
describe approximately the same population. The target population for the face-to-face 
mode was 222.6 million U.S. citizens age 18 or older living in the 48 contiguous states of 
the USA or the District of Columbia, and the target population for the Internet mode was 




With the use of the sample weights provided, the survey is designed to describe a 
representative sample of U.S. citizens age 18 or older living in the United States on the 
basis of age, gender, race-ethnicity, education, region, and party identification. All the 
results I present are weighted to correct for unequal probability of selection and for 
nonresponse to the survey. The response rate, using the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research (AAPOR) formula for the minimum response rate (known as AAPOR 
Response Rate 1) on the pre-election interview, was 50 percent for the face-to-face 
component and 44 percent for the Internet component.  The re-interview rate on the post-
election survey was 90 percent for the face-to-face component and 84 percent for the 
Internet component. Of the 4,271 respondents, 2,631 respondents (a) completed both the 
pre and post surveys, (b) and self-identified as non-Hispanic White. 
 
Because the American National Elections Studies data was collected using a complex 
sampling design, I estimate variance using a Taylor series estimation that computes 
variances within each stratum and pools estimates together (DeBell 2010). All my 
analyses also include sample weights that correct for unequal probability of selection and 
for nonresponse to the survey. Finally, I produce design-consistent estimates in all my 
analyses by using the Taylor Series method (DeBell 2010). 
 
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable measures feelings towards Black Lives 
Matter through a feeling thermometer ranging from 0-100. According to the ANES, 
respondents were given a visual sketch of a thermometer for reference, which placed 100 
as a “very warm or favorable feeling,” 50 representing  “no feeling at all” and 0 for “very 
cold or unfavorable feeling,” with appropriate brackets in between. This variable was 
kept as a continuous variable for the analysis with higher numbers indicating more 





Independent Variables: To facilitate interpretation,  all independent variables were 
scaled to 0-1 with 1 being the highest possible value for the measure and 0 being the 
lowest possible value for that measure. A chart detailing measure construction and alpha 
coefficients of all variables is included in the appendix.  
 
Principled conservatism: I constructed two scales to measure conservative ideology. My 
first scale, social conservatism was constructed using four survey items on marriage, 
traditional values, abortion, and religiosity. The alpha coefficient for social conservatism 
was 0.74. The second scale, fiscal conservatism was constructed using four survey items 
on limited government, business, tax, and welfare. The alpha coefficient for fiscal 
conservatism was 0.70. Both measures were coded so that higher values indicated higher 
levels of conservatism. The correlation between fiscal and social conservatism was 0.40.2  
 
Orientation towards protest: I constructed two scales to measure general orientation 
towards protest. The first question assessed respondents perception of how justified the 
police are in roughing up protesters. The scale ran from 5 meaning a great deal, 4 
meaning a lot, 3 meaning a modest amount, 2 meaning a little, and 1 meaning not at all. 
The second question assessed respondent perceptions of how justified protesters are in 
the use of violence.  The scale ran from 5 meaning a great deal, 4 meaning a lot, 3 
meaning a modest amount, 2 meaning a little, and 1 meaning not at all. In all my analysis, 
I test these two questions as two separate independent variables. I do this because they 
did not load to a sufficient degree on one factor during factor analysis suggesting that the 
comments measure different dimensions of an orientation towards social movements. 
However, I keep both variables as both dimensions of this orientation are informative in 
their own right. Both variables were coded so that higher numbers signify more negative 
                                                
2 I investigated whether fiscal and social conservatism may be tapping a single construct. A varimax factor 
analysis of the eight measures used to construct the two scales showed that they generate two distinct 
factors. The four items used to construct the scale, fiscal conservatism, loaded on the first factor 
(Eigenvalue 1.10) and the three items used to construct the scale, social conservatism, loaded on the second 
factor (Eigenvalue 1.83).  
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orientations towards protest. I follow the example of previous scholars and argue that 
these items act as a general construct of orientations towards protest and insurgent 
politics as a legitimate means of attaining political goals (Isaac, Mutran, and Stryker 
1980). 
 
Orientation towards police: My measure of general orientation towards the police is 
based on a feeling thermometer that assessed respondents’ attitudes towards the police. 
These data show that the mean response on the feeling thermometer was 0.79 indicating 
that the respondents in my sample had relatively positive feelings towards the police.  
 
Moral equalitarianism: My measure of moral equalitarianism was constructed using 
three survey items. All items were measured on a 5 point Likert scale with options: Agree 
strongly, Agree somewhat, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree somewhat, Disagree 
strongly. The statements were (1) This country would be better off if we worried less 
about how equal people are. (2) It is not really that big a problem if some people have 
more of a chance in life than others. (3) If people were treated more equally in this 
country we would have many fewer problems. The alpha coefficient for moral 
equalitarianism was 0.70. The responses were coded so that higher values indicate that 
individuals had stronger beliefs in equality as a principle.  
 
Colorblind racism: I constructed the scale, colorblind racism that measures the degree to 
which respondents adhered to colorblind racial ideology. This measure was created using 
four survey items. All items were measured on a 5 point Likert scale with options: Agree 
strongly, Agree somewhat, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree somewhat, Disagree 
strongly. (1) Blacks should work up without special favors. (2) Past slavery makes life 
more difficult for Blacks. (3) Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (4) Blacks must 
try harder to get ahead. The alpha coefficient for colorblind racism was 0.74 and 
responses were coded so that higher values indicate greater adherence to colorblind racial 
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ideology. This scale is similar to the ones constructed by previous scholars (Bobo and 
Kluegel, 1993; Sears and Henry, 2003).  
 
Overt racism: The overt racism scale was constructed using three survey items measuring 
traditional expressions of overt racism. The first item is a feeling thermometer measuring 
feelings towards Black-Americans from 0-100. The second and third items were 
questions assessing whether individuals hold negative racial stereotypes. (1) What would 
you rate Blacks on a scale of 1-7? (where 1 indicates peaceful, 7 means violent, and 4 
indicates that respondents rated most Blacks are not closer to either end). (2) What would 
you rate Blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates hardworking, 7 means lazy, and 4 
means respondents rated Blacks are not close to either end). The alpha coefficient of the 
overt racism scale was 0.72 and responses were coded so that higher values indicate 
higher reports of overt racism.  
 
Perceived group threat: The perceived group threat scale measures the degree to which 
individuals perceive out-group threat to Whites as a racial collective. This scale was 
constructed using the following question: (1) Perceived discrimination: “How much 
discrimination is there in the United States today against Whites? 1. A great deal. 2. A lot. 
3. A moderate amount. 4. A little. 5. None at all. (2) Perception of economic threat : 
“How likely is it that many Whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring 
minorities instead? 1. Extremely likely. 2. Very likely. 3. Moderately likely. 4. Slightly 
likely. 5. Not at all likely. (3) Perception of unfair laws against Whites: How important is 
it that Whites work together to change laws that are unfair to Whites? 1. Extremely 
important 2. Very important. 3. Moderately important. 4. A little important 5. Not at all 
important. The alpha coefficient of that scale is 0.64.3 
                                                
3 In a varimax factor analysis, the three measures loaded onto the first factor with an Eigenvalue of 0.92. 
The factor loading for perceived discrimination was 0.31, perceptions of economic threat was 0.62, and 
perceptions of unfair laws to rights was 0.66. Although not optimal, I choose to keep the measure because 
the survey items are the best available in this dataset to measure the general construct of perceived group 
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Nationalism: I constructed the nationalism scale to measure the degree to which 
individuals held nationalistic beliefs. The scale was constructed using three survey items. 
(1) National pride: “When you see the American flag flying, does it make you feel good, 
bad, or neither good nor bad? 1. Good 2. Bad 3. Neither good nor bad. (2) National 
identification: “How important is being American to one’s identity?” 1. Extremely 
important 2. Very important. 3. Moderately important. 4. A little important 5. Not at all 
important. (3) National Hubris4:  ‘The world would be a better place if people from other 
countries were more like Americans.’ 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither 
agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly. The alpha coefficient of 
this scale was 0.70 and responses were coded so that higher values indicate greater 
adherence to nationalistic sentiments measured by the aforementioned survey items.  
 
Sociodemographic variables: Education is a continuous measure from 1 year of 
education to 16 years of education. Gender is a dichotomous variable with women as the 
omitted category. Income is a continuous measure of income, logged due to a positive 
skew. Church attendance is measured using the question “Do you go to religious 
services [every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or 
never/ never, a few times a year, once or twice a month, almost every week, or every 
week]? Political party options is limited to Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. 
Religion is limited to non-religious, protestant, catholic, Jewish. Non-religious is the 
omitted category.  Age is a continuous variable from 18-90 years old. Table 1 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the following analyses.  
                                                                                                                                            
threat. I also argue that they are able to capture the general construct of perceived group threat that is 
different from the other constructs tested.  
4 In line with Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), I use the term national hubris to describe form of 
patriotism that is extent in extent and entails not only pride in one’s own group but assertions of superiority 




I employed ordinary least squares to present my results. 12.77 % of the data is missing.  I 
imputed missing data based on the demographic variables allowing me to analyze a 
complete data set with no missing cases.  I then replicated the same analysis using 
listwise deletion. The results are substantively the same. I did not detect excessive 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 STANDARDIZED 
 
UNSTANDARDIZED SCALE OBSERVATIONS 
VARIABLES Mean SE Mean SE Min Max  
 















Social Conservatism 0.46 (0.01) 0.46 (0.01) 0 1 2629 
Fiscal Conservatism 0.54 (0.00) 0.54 (0.00) 0 1 2629 
Justified Police Force 0.36 (0.01) 2.45 (0.04) 1 5 2599 
Unjustified Protest Violence 0.95 (0.00) 4.79 (0.02) 1 5 2613 
Pro-Police Affect 0.79 (0.01) 78.88 (0.55) 0 100 2620 

















Overt Racism 0.46 (0.00) 0.46 (0.00) 0 1 2606 
Perceived Group Threat 0.32 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 0 1 2611 
Nationalism  0.80 (0.00) 0.80 (0.00) 0 1 2630 
Education 10.92 (0.06) 10.92 (0.06) 1 16 2611 
Income (Logged) 2.60 (0.03) 2.60 (0.03) 0 3.33 2526 
Men1 48.30% (0.01) 48.30% (0.01) 1 0 2609 
Church Attendance 2.41 (0.04) 2.41 (0.04)  1 5 2630 
Democrat 29.20% (0.02) 29.20% (0.02) 0 1 741 
Republican 36.20% (0.01) 36.30% (0.01) 0 1 904 
Independent 34.50% (0.01) 34.50% (0.01) 0 1 863 
Non-Religious 44.90% (0.01) 44.90% (0.01) 0 1 1147 
Protestant 24.01% (0.01) 24.01% (0.01) 0 1 676 
Catholic 13.52% (0.01) 13.52% (0.01) 0 1 368 
Jewish 1.31% (0.00) 1.31% (0.00) 0 1 37  
Age 48.72 (0.50) 48.72 (0.50) 18 90 2573 
        
 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Note.— Weighted Values Shown. 






In table 2, I investigate the association between racial prejudice and orientation 
towards the Black Lives Matter movement, while accounting for prominent race-neutral 
explanations. In Model 1, I test the effects of four measures from the race-centric camp 
on attitudes towards the movement. Results show that nationalism, colorblind racism and 
overt racism significantly predict negative attitudes towards Black Lives Matter although 
the colorblind racism and overt racism effect are particularly large. Model 2 tests the 
predictive power of measures from the race-neutral camp namely fiscal conservatism, 
social conservatism, orientation towards the police, moral equalitarianism and orientation 
towards protest on attitudes towards Black Lives Matter. Results indicate that the 
variables from the race-neutral camp all predict negative attitudes towards the Black 
Lives Matter movement except for moral equalitarianism, which predicts substantial 
support for the movement. In Model 3, I include all variables from both the race-neutral 
and race-centric camp. I find that once we include measures of racial attitudes, there is a 
significant decline in effect sizes for nearly all variables in the race-neutral camp and 
orientation towards police is no longer significant. Fiscal conservatism is the exception. 
Furthermore, colorblind racism maintains the largest effect on orientation towards Black 
Lives Matter and overt racism barely changes in effect size. These findings provide 
evidence that racial attitudes are the most dominant factors shaping White orientations 
towards the contemporary black movement.  
In table 2, I investigate my second question: how does White subscription to the 
various racial schemas vary by sociodemographic factors? I find overwhelming 
consistency in the sociodemographic factors that predict subscription to all racial 
schemas. Specifically, Republicans and Independents are consistently more likely to 
subscribe to every racial schema. Conversely, higher education and income consistently 
predict lower subscription to every racial schema. Also, in line with existing research, 
religion is a prominent factor shaping White political orientations but it’s effect is 
nuanced. I find that all religious respondents except for Jewish respondents are 
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significantly more likely to subscribe to all racial schemas than their non-religious 
counterparts. However, respondents who attend church more often are also less likely to 
subscribe to overt racial schemas. Finally, I find that White men are more likely than 
White women to report overt racial schemas, whereas White women are more likely than 




Table 2. Regression Models predicting attitudes towards Black Lives Matter 
(n=2,631) 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 





















  Perceived Group Threat -1.17 (3.30)   -0.29 (3.26) 
  Nationalism 











      
  Social Conservatism   -19.48*** (2.74) -8.28*** (2.62) 
  Fiscal Conservatism   -39.17*** (3.19) -30.63*** (2.99) 
  Justified Police Force   -7.63*** (2.71) 2.53 (3.49) 
  Unjustified Protest Violence   -14.50*** (1.74) -6.50*** (1.65) 
  Pro-Police Affect   -9.70*** (3.38) -6.86** (3.12) 
  Moral Equalitarianism    25.30*** (2.83) 9.16*** (2.73) 
 
Sociodemographic Controls 
      
  Education -0.59 (0.23) 0.21 (0.24) -0.51** (0.23) 
  Income (Logged) -0.92 (0.62) -0.23 (0.66) -0.77 (0.60) 
  Men1 -6.78*** (0.96) -5.16*** (1.01) -5.51*** (0.94) 
  Church Attendance  0.38 (0.40) 2.34*** (0.40) 1.05*** (0.38) 
  Protestant  -0.28 (1.39) 0.34 (1.45) 0.81 (1.34) 
  Catholic 0.63 (1.57) -0.39 (1.64) 0.72 (1.51) 
  Jewish 5.16 (4.25) 4.03 (4.43) 4.48 (4.10) 
  Republican3  -14.56*** (1.37) -10.34*** (1.55) -6.92*** (1.44) 
  Independent  -7.02*** (1.24) -5.61*** (1.33) -3.03*** (1.23) 
  Age 0.05* (0.03) 0.11*** (0.30) 0.08** (0.03) 
       
Constant 
R2 
     115.53 








       
 
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Note.—Weighted and Imputed  Coefficients Presented. 
1Women are the omitted category. 




Table 3. Regression Models predicting attitudes towards racial schemas (n=2,631) 
 COLORBLIND 
RACISM 
OVERT RACISM  PERCEIVED GROUP 
THREAT   
NATIONALISM  
VARIABLES Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
         
Men1 0.33 (1.02) 1.27** (1.12) -2.28*** (1.07) -1.99*** (0.67) 
Education -2.81*** (0.24) -0.59*** (0.27) -1.32*** (0.25) -0.99* (0.16) 
Logged Income  -1.61*** (0.66) -1.38*** (0.73) -2.59*** (0.70) -0.75*** (0.44) 
Church  -0.77 (0.53) -1.40*** (0.38) -0.93 (0.26)  1.01*** 0.27) 
Protestant2 5.41*** (1.85) 3.14** (1.35) 2.25*** (1.27) 1.35*** (0.98) 
Catholic 6.75*** (1.92) 3.35** (1.40) 4.22*** (1.32)       2.33** (1.11) 
Jewish -5.28 (4.29) 3.77 (3.11) -2.68 (2.93)        0.72  (3.00)) 
Republican3 27.71*** (1.41) 8.83*** (1.43) 10.89*** (1.34) 13.29*** (0.87) 
Independent 16.52*** (1.32) 4.63*** (1.42) 7.30*** (1.34) 5.19*** (0.85) 
Age 0.11*** (0.24) 0.66** (0.27) 0.04** (0.25) 0.23 (0.23) 













         
         
*** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1 
Notes.— Weighted and Imputed Values shown. 
Dependent Variables Scaled to 0-100. 
1Women are the omitted category 
2Non-religious is the omitted category 







Ethnoracial political mobilization generates a context of heighted visibility around 
racial contentions (Kriesi 2004). This makes it a unique empirical opportunity to examine 
White attitudes towards direct political claims of racial inequality. Most studies of 
contemporary racism examine White public opinion towards indirect targets primarily 
government sponsored race-based policies. Many studies on White public opinion 
towards Black political action were concerning the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. 
As such, this study addresses the lack of empirical evidence in the literature on White 
public opinion towards contemporary black political action and the role of racial attitudes 
in shaping those sociopolitical views. Such empirical accounts remain important to 
contribute to the broader theoretical and public debate over the significance of race and 
racism in shaping the sociopolitical context of the contemporary United States.  
My first research question examines the extent to which racial prejudice predicts 
White orientations towards the Black Lives Matter movement. I find evidence that racial 
prejudice is the most significant predictor of White opposition towards Black Lives 
Matter, even when we take prominent race-neutral explanations into account. Orientation 
towards police is one ostensibly race-neutral explanation that is manifested in the 
counter-mobilization Blue Lives Matter. This counter-framework organizes their 
opposition towards Black Lives Matter around a concern for law enforcement. The 
results of this study do not negate that a concern for law enforcement shapes orientation 
towards the movement, but it does provide evidence that orientation towards the police is 
not a dominant or even strong predictor of White orientations towards the Black Lives 
Matter movement.  
The All Lives Matter mantra is another prominent oppositional framework against 
Black Lives Matter. This mantra purports that a general concern for all lives fuels 
opposition against a movement that highlights the lives of one particular racial group. I 
investigate this claim by examining the association between moral equalitarianism and 
feelings towards Black Lives Matter in Table 2. Contrary to the All Lives Matter claim 
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that a commitment to equalitarianism drives opposition towards Black Lives Matter, I 
find that individuals reporting higher levels of commitment to equalitarianism are 
actually more likely to support the movement. This finding suggests that the All Lives 
Matter mantra may be more a manifestation of colorblind racial ideologies that 
delegitimize Black political grievances of racial inequality rather than a concern for 
equalitarianism.  
Race scholars have claimed that colorblind racial schemas dominate the racial 
landscape of the United States in the contemporary context (Bonilla-Silva 2000; Omi and 
Winant 2015). Although colorblind racism is the most dominant predictor, I also find 
evidence against the notion of “colorblind hegemony.” Overt racism also exerts a large 
and independent effect on White orientations towards Black Lives Matter, which is in 
line with scholars that argue against the dismissal of “traditional racism” in favor of “new 
racism” in understanding contemporary race relations (Tesler 2016; Brown et. al 2008). 
Furthermore, nationalism also exerts a significant and independent effect on orientation 
towards Black Lives Matter. This findings encourages continued investigations on the 
association between national identity and racial politics in the United States.  
Finally, I examine whether White subscription to various racial schemas varies by 
sociodemographic characteristics. In line with existing research, individuals with higher 
income and education were less likely to subscribe to all racial schemas whereas Non-
Democrats were significantly more likely to subscribe to all racial schemas. Furthermore, 
I find evidence to support the notion that religion or the lack thereof is a significant 
shaper of White political orientations but the effect is nuanced. Non-religious individuals 
are significantly less likely to subscribe to racial schemas than their religious 
counterparts. However, high church attendance decreases reports of overt racial schemas. 
This is in line with existing evidence that church attendance is a strong indicator of 
religiosity.  
I also find that White men are more likely to report overt racial schemas whereas 
White women are more likely to report subscription to racial schemas related to 
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nationhood and perceived group threat. Table 2 shows that White men in general are less 
likely than White women to support the Black Lives Matter movement. This has potential 
implications for how racism in conceptualized in the public imaginary. For example, 
overt denunciations of Black Lives Matter are likely to garner more public attention. My 
results show that these overt racial expressions are more likely to be spearheaded by men 
meaning that the “face” of racism can easily become a man’s face. However, the fact that 
White women are less likely to subscribe to overt racial schemas but more likely to 
subscribe to racial schemas concerning perceived group threat and nationhood suggest 
that there may be gendered variations in the ways that racial attitudes are expressed. 
Future research should continue to examine gendered differences in expressions of racial 
feelings.  
It can be argued that race infuses all of the variables that were tested in the model 
and thus it is impossible to divide the camps into “race-neutral” and “race-centric.” I 
agree with other scholars that conservatism, orientation towards the police, orientation 
towards protest are all likely shaped by racial meanings and histories (Federico & 
Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Correlation analysis also confirm that 
there are significant correlations between the different models tested in both the “race-
neutral” camp and the “race-centric” camp. Yet, the analysis also suggests that the 
frameworks are sufficiently distinct to warrant separate constructs. These high 
correlations suggest, however, that the effects of racial attitudes on shaping orientation 
towards Black Lives Matter may be underestimated.    
What this study contributes is an empirical account of modern White attitudes 
towards Black political action on a nationally representative sample of White-Americans. 
It shows a prevailing association between racial attitudes and White orientations towards 
Black political action in the contemporary context, even when we take prominent 




White opposition towards Black political claims of racial inequality is based in a racial 
structure and yet examining the factors that shape opposition towards the contemporary 
black movement reflects the evolving nature of white opposition. I find evidence against 
the notion of the declining significance of race and racism in shaping contemporary 
political attitudes among Whites. Furthermore, we must interrogate this theoretical 
narrative that we have moved from overt racism to new racisms characterized by 
colorblind racial schemas. My findings show that beyond colorblind racism, overt racism 
and nationalism are also shaping race relations in the contemporary context. Together 
these findings are not only an empirical account of White opposition towards the Black 





Table 4. Measure Construction Chart 
 
Fiscal Conservatism measure is a composite variable consisting of the following survey items 
on limited government, business, tax, and welfare.   
1) Limited Government: Which of the two statements comes closer to your view? – 1. The 
main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten 
involved in things that people should do for themselves. 2. Government has become 
bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.  
2) Business: How much government regulation of business is good for society? – 1. A 
Great Deal 2. A Lot 3. Moderate Amount 4. a Little 5. None at All.  
3) Tax: Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose increasing income taxes on 
people making over one million dollars per year? – 1.  Favor 2. Oppose, 3. Neither 
Favor or Oppose.  
4) Welfare: Should federal spending on welfare programs be increased, decreased or kept 
the same? – 1. Increased 2. Decreased 3. Kept the Same.  
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.1. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.70.  The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of fiscal conservatism. 
 
Social Conservatism measure is a composite variable consisting of four survey items on 
marriage, traditional values, abortion, and religiosity.  
1) Gay and Lesbian Marriage: “Which comes closest to your view?”—1. Gay and 
Lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry 2. Gay and lesbian couples should 
be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry, 3. There should be no legal 
recognition of a gay or lesbian couple’s relationship.  
2) Traditional Family Values:  “This country would have many fewer problems if there 
were more emphasis on traditional family ties.” – 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly.  
3) Abortion: “Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?” – 1. 
By law, abortion should never be permitted 2. By law, only in case of rape, incest, or 
woman’s life in danger 3.  By law, for reasons other than rape, incest, or woman’s life 
in danger is need established 4. By law, abortion as a matter of personal choice, 5. 
Other Specify, Don’t Know, and Refused.  
4) Religiosity: Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?— 1. 
Important 2. Important 3. Don’t know 4. Refused.  
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.83. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.74. The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1  
measure so that higher values signify higher levels of social conservatism.  
 27 
Table 4, cont.  
 
Orientation towards protest consists of two measures using two questions on protest. 
1)  Police Violence Justified: The first question assessed respondents perception of how 
justified the police are in roughing up protesters. The scale ran from 5 meaning a great 
deal, 4 meaning a lot, 3 meaning a modest amount, 2 meaning a little, and 1 meaning 
not at all.  
2) Protesters Violence Unjustified: The second question assessed respondent perceptions 
of how justified protesters are in the use of violence.  The scale ran from 5 meaning a 
great deal, 4 meaning a lot, 3 meaning a modest amount, 2 meaning a little, and 1 
meaning not at all.  
 
 
Moral equalitarianism consists of four variables. All questions were measured on a 5 point 
Likert scale with options: Agree strongly, Agree somewhat, Neither agree nor disagree, 
Disagree somewhat, Disagree strongly. 
1. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are 
2. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others. 
3. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer 
problems.’ 
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.58. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.70. The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of subscription to moral equalitarianism. 
 
Orientation towards Police was measured using feeling thermometer ranging from 0-100 of 
feelings towards the police with higher numbers meaning more positive feelings towards the 
police. 
-The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher values signify higher 
positive feelings towards law enforcement.  
 
Colorblind racism measure is a composite variable consisting of four standard survey items 
used to measure new racisms that blend anti-Black affect and individualism. All questions 
were measured on a 5 point Likert scale with options: Agree strongly, Agree somewhat, 
Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree somewhat, Disagree strongly.  
1) Blacks should work up without special favors  
2) Past slavery makes life more difficult for Blacks 
3) Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.  
4) Blacks must try harder to get ahead.  
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of  3.87. The Cronbach 
Alpha score was 0.74. The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of subscription to colorblind racial logics.  
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Table 4, cont.  
 
Overt racism measure is a composite variable consisting of three survey items measuring 
traditional expressions of overt racism.  
1) Feeling thermometer ranging from 1-100 on feelings towards Blacks 
 2) Question assessing stereotypical association between Blacks and violence. Respondents 
were asked to rate Blacks on a scale from peaceful to violent with 7 meaning violent and 1 
meaning peaceful 
3) Question assessing stereotypical association between Blacks and work ethic using a variable 
that measures how hardworking respondents think Blacks are on a scale from lazy to 
hardworking 7 meaning lazy and 1 meaning hardworking. 
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.61. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.72. The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of subscription to overt racial logics. 
 
 
Perceived discrimination is measured using the following question.   
1) Perception of economic threat : “How likely is it that many Whites are unable to find a job 
because employers are hiring minorities instead? 1. Extremely likely. 2. Very likely. 3. 
Moderately likely. 4. Slightly likely. 5. Not at all likely.  
2) Perception of unfair laws against Whites: How important is it that Whites work together to 
change laws that are unfair to Whites? 1. Extremely important 2. Very important. 3. 
Moderately important. 4. A little important 5. Not at all important.  
3) Perception of discrimination against Whites. “How much discrimination is there in the 
United States today against Whites? 1. A great deal. 2. A lot. 3. A moderate amount. 4. A 
little. 5. None at all.  
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.24. Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.62.  The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of subscription to perceived group threat racial logics. 
 
Nation-Based Logic is a composite variable consisting of three survey items derived from 
factor analysis. 
1) Feelings towards Flag: When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel good, 
bad, or neither good nor bad? 1. Good. 2. Bad. 3. Neither good nor bad.  
2) American Identity: How important is being White to one’s identity? 1. Extremely important 
2. Very important. 3. Moderately important. 4. A little important 5. Not at all important.  
4) American Superiority:  ‘The world would be a better place if people from other countries 
were more like Americans.’ 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor 
disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly.  
-Together these values loaded onto a single factor with an Eigenvalue of 1.77. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha score was 0.70.  The measure was coded and rescaled to a 0-1 measure so that higher 
values signify higher levels of subscription to nation-based racial logics. 
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Table 4, cont.  
 
Sociodemographic Variables:  
Education is a continuous measure from 1 year of education to 16 years of education 
Gender is a dichotomous variable. Women are the omitted category.   
Income is a continuous measure of income, logged due to a positive skew 
Church attendance is measured using the question “Do you go to religious services [every 
week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never/ never, a few 
times a year, once or twice a month, almost every week, or every week]?  
Political party options is limited to Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. 
Religion is limited to non-religious, protestant, catholic, Jewish, other religion. Non-religious 
are the omitted category.  
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